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Waiving Goodbye to First Amendment 




First Amendment free speech doctrine is built on the understanding that 
“[c]ompulsory unification of opinion achieves only the unanimity of the 
graveyard.”1  However, despite this understanding, the First Amendment is 
not inviolable.  The Supreme Court has acknowledged that it is possible to 
waive (intentionally relinquish a right or privilege) First Amendment speech 
rights.2  But in doing so, the Supreme Court did not affirmatively establish 
the applicable test for cases involving First Amendment rights.  Instead, the 
lower courts have been left to their own devices to determine the appropriate 
standard to apply in cases involving waiver of freedom of speech. 
Waiver doctrine has its roots in Johnson v. Zerbst, a 1938 case on the 
Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel, in which the Supreme Court 
began to outline the requirements for waiver.3  Prior to Zerbst, while the 
Supreme Court had suggested that it was possible to waive constitutional 
rights, it had not clearly established the elements for waiver.4  In Zerbst, the 
defendant was arrested for possession of counterfeit bills and indicted, 
convicted, and sentenced at trial without assistance of counsel.5  Defendant 
petitioned for habeas corpus and his petition was denied.6  The government 
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 1.  W. Va. State Board of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 641 (1943). 
 2.  Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 135 (1967). 
 3.  Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 459 (1938). 
 4.  See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932). 
 5.  Zerbst, 304 U.S. at 460. 
 6.  Id. at 458. 
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argued that Defendant waived his right to counsel.7  On review, the Supreme 
Court held that waiver requires an “intentional [voluntary] relinquishment or 
abandonment of a known right or privilege.”8  Further, the Supreme Court 
concluded that waiver is dependent on the particular facts and circumstances 
of the case––including background, experience, and conduct of the waiving 
individual.9  This requirement has since been expanded in subsequent 
criminal rights cases to a requirement that waiver be knowing, voluntary, and 
intelligent.10
First Amendment waiver in contrast to waiver of rights in criminal 
proceedings (criminal waiver), does not have a robust history.  While the 
Supreme Court has stated that waiver of First Amendment rights are 
waivable, any jurisprudence has remained lacking.  First Amendment waiver 
by contract exists in a gap between the Supreme Court’s prior restraint 
doctrine, which prohibits judicial suppression of speech prior to its 
occurrence,11 and the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, which prohibits 
the government from conditioning benefits on an agreement to waive a 
constitutional right.12  This Note asserts that First Amendment free speech 
rights may be waived by contracts between private parties and enforced 
when waiver is knowing, voluntary, and intelligent––the same standard 
required for waiver of criminal rights.  First, this Note will examine the set 
of circumstances under which First Amendment waiver was established.  
Second, this Note will discuss how enforcement of private contracts 
constitutes sufficient state action (governmental interference with a 
constitutional right)13 to implicate the First Amendment.  Third, this Note 
will review the requirements of criminal waiver, compare them as applied in 
First Amendment waiver cases, and outline an expanded test for waiver to 
aid in analysis of First Amendment waiver.  Finally, this Note will discuss 
how the courts justify First Amendment waiver, and provide examples of 
how the courts have weighed First Amendment interests against the interests 
favoring enforcement of contracts. 
7.  Zerbst, 304 U.S. at 464.  
8.  Id.
 9.  Id. at 459. 
 10.  See infra Section VI.  
 11.  New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 725 (1971). 
 12.  Richard A. Epstein, Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power, and the Limits of Consent,
102 HARV. L. REV. 4, 7 (1988). 
 13.  Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 620 (1991). 
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I.  The Supreme Court Has Not Expressly Stated a Standard for 
First Amendment Waiver 
First Amendment waiver doctrine has not been explored extensively by 
the Supreme Court.  The Supreme Court has not articulated a test for First 
Amendment waiver and has instead left this determination to the lower 
courts.  Frequently, First Amendment waiver is found in contracts of 
silence—such as employment, settlement agreements, and trade secrets.14  In 
such situations, it appears that the Court weighs First Amendment rights 
against the interests in confidentiality or prohibiting particular speech.15
Further, in the above circumstances, the consideration or policy supporting 
waiver is very clear because it is based on negotiated contractual or quasi-
contractual agreements.16
The Court rarely overtly discusses First Amendment waiver in its 
opinions.  It is somewhat baffling that the Court has been willing to articulate 
a waiver test in other constitutional rights cases but has not expressly 
articulated a standard for evaluating First Amendment waiver.  Instead, the 
Court appears to engage in a totality of the circumstances analysis, without 
identifying the elements that would trigger a finding of First Amendment 
waiver. 
Snepp v. U.S. is one of the few cases in which the Court implies that 
First Amendment waiver has occurred.17  In 1968, Snepp signed a contract 
with the Central Intelligence Agency (“CIA”) conditioning his employment 
on Snepp’s agreement not to publish any information relating to his 
employment without agency approval.18  When Snepp published a book 
about CIA activities in Vietnam, the CIA sued seeking enforcement of the 
employment agreement.19  In response, Snepp alleged that enforcement of 
the contract was a prior restraint on speech in violation of the First 
Amendment.20  The Supreme Court, in a footnote to the opinion, determined 
that Snepp voluntarily signed the agreement in exchange for employment 
and that obtaining such an agreement was within the CIA’s power.21  The 
 14.  Alan E. Garfield, Promises of Silence: Contract Law and Freedom of Speech, 83 
CORNELL L. REV. 261, 265 (1998). 
 15.  Id. at 296. 
 16.  A quasi-contract is a variant of an implied-in law contract where an obligation is imposed 
by law on individuals due to a special relationship between the parties.  Contract, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).  This term may be applied to all noncontractual obligations which 
are treated as if they are contracts for the purpose of affording a remedy.  Id.
 17.  Garfield, supra note 14, at 354 (citing Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 508 (1983)).  
 18.  Snepp, 444 U.S. at 508. 
 19.  Id. at 507. 
 20.  Id. at 503 n.3. 
 21.  Id.
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Supreme Court held that Snepp’s confidentiality agreement with the CIA 
was enforceable as a matter of national security and enforcement did not 
violate the First Amendment.22  In determining that the agreement was 
enforceable, the Supreme Court implied that a party may voluntarily waive 
their First Amendment rights.  Beyond that brief footnote, the Court did not 
perform any additional waiver analysis, nor did it expressly comment on 
waiver in the opinion. 
Similarly, in Cohen v. Cowles Media Company, the Court upheld a 
claim for promissory estoppel that prohibited reporters from engaging in free 
speech.23  In Cohen, Cohen agreed to provide documents relating to a 
candidate in the 1982 gubernatorial election to Cowles Media reporters.24
Cohen’s agreement to provide information was predicated on the reporters’ 
agreement to not disclose his identity in relation to the released 
information.25  However, the reporters breached the agreement upon 
publication by unilaterally deciding to reveal Cohen’s identity to the 
public.26  Cohen subsequently sued for breach of contract.27  Cowles Media 
argued that the First Amendment barred enforcement of the agreement 
because it would infringe on their free speech.28  The Cohen Court held that 
a promissory estoppel claim was not in violation of the First Amendment 
because it was permitted under state law and did not specifically target the 
press.29  Further, while enforcement of the agreement in Cohen had First 
Amendment implications, it did not substantively offend the First 
Amendment because any effects on the press were incidental to 
enforcement.30  However, in Cohen, the Supreme Court did not address a 
standard for waiver, and instead concluded that enforcement of generally 
applicable laws will not offend the First Amendment.31  There, the parties 
knowingly restricted their own ability to speak because they voluntarily 
agreed to not disclose their source. 32  Therefore the Court, in relying on the 
promissory estoppel claim, found that the parties waived their First 
Amendment rights.33 Cohen suggests that when parties have agreed to 
 22.  Snepp, 444 U.S. at 507. 
 23.  Cohen v. Cowles Media Company, 501 U.S. 663, 671–72 (1991).
 24.  Id. at 664.
 25.  Id.
 26.  Id. at 666. 
 27.  Id.
 28.  Id.
 29.  Cohen, 501 U.S. at 670.
 30.  Id. at 669. 
31.  Id. 
 32.  Id. at 661. 
 33.  Id.
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restrict their First Amendment rights (in this case by agreeing not to disclose 
a source’s name), there is no offense to the First Amendment, and therefore 
the Court will not engage in any First Amendment analysis. 
In both Snepp and Cohen, the Supreme Court failed to give substantive 
guidance to help in making a determination of First Amendment waiver.  The 
single similarity between the two cases is that at their foundation the 
obligations that created the waiver are contractually based.  Perhaps the 
closest the Court has come to articulating a test for First Amendment waiver 
was in a case in which there was no contract, Curtis Publishing v. Butts.
In Curtis, the Saturday Evening Post accused a university athletic 
director of fixing a college football game.34  The director filed a libel action 
and on appeal Curtis Publishing raised waiver of the director’s First 
Amendment rights as a defense against the claim because he failed to raise 
any constitutional arguments before trial.35  The Court held that waiver must 
be of a known right or privilege and that the defense has the burden of 
proving that the waiver occurred through clear and compelling evidence.36
Accordingly, First Amendment rights may not be waived simply by showing 
that an argument was not presented in earlier litigation.37  Any waiver must 
be made knowingly.38  This case is the only case specifically addressing First 
Amendment waiver and to that extent, it is incomplete in comparison to the 
standard the lower courts have applied to First Amendment waiver. 
II.  First Amendment Waiver by Contract Is Permitted by the 
Third and Ninth Circuit Courts 
The Third and Ninth Circuits have established that contracts between 
non-governmental parties may waive First Amendment rights.  Waiver is 
generally permitted in employment contracts,39 collective bargaining 
agreements,40 and consent decrees.  Both courts have applied the criminal 
proceeding waiver standard from Johnson v. Zerbst to First Amendment 
waiver.  The Third and Ninth Circuits will enforce waiver of First 
 34.  Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 135 (1967). 
 35.  Id. at 135. 
 36.  Id. at 145. 
 37.  Id.
 38.  Id.
 39.  See Garfield, supra note 14, at 265. 
 40.  Leonard v. Clark, 12 F.3d 885 (9th Cir. 1993); Barnard v. Lackawanna Cty., 194 
F.Supp.3d 337 (2016). 
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Amendment rights by contract when waiver is made knowingly, voluntarily, 
and intelligently.41
A.  First Amendment Waiver Is Enforceable in the Ninth Circuit 
1.  National Abortion Federation v. Center For Medical Progress:
First Amendment Waiver by Contract Permits Judicial 
Suppression of Speech.
In National Abortion Federation v. Center. For Medical Progress, the 
defendants, David Daleiden and Troy Newman, on behalf of the Center for 
Medical Progress (“CMP”), infiltrated National Abortion Federation 
(“NAF”) annual meetings in 2014 and 2015 and secretly recorded 
presentations and conversations for the CMP’s Human Capital Project.42
CMP claimed their recordings were intended to prove that NAF members, 
including Planned Parenthood executives, were allegedly engaged in 
criminal activity by profiteering from the sale of fetal tissue.43  NAF required 
meeting participants to sign non-disclosure agreements prohibiting recording 
and distribution of NAF materials to third parties.44  Beginning in July 2015, 
CMP began publishing video recordings that it had covertly recorded of 
Planned Parenthood executives, and threatened to publish similar 
surreptitiously recorded videos that CMP had taken at NAF’s confidential 
meetings.45  Plaintiff NAF sued Defendants seeking damages for breach of 
contract, violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 1964 (the Racketeer Influenced and 
Corrupt Organizations Act),46 and a preliminary injunction to prevent CMP 
from releasing NAF materials obtained in 2014 and 2015.47  Judge Orrick of 
the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California granted a 
temporary restraining order, and after further proceedings, a preliminary 
injunction to the NAF, enjoining CMP from the following: 
1.  Publishing or disclosing to any third party any video, audio, 
photographic, or other recordings taken, or any confidential 
information learned during any NAF annual meetings; 
 41.  Leonard, 12 F.3d at 886; Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Republican Nat’l Comm., 673 F.3d 
192, 206–07 (3d Cir. 2012); Barnard, 194 F.Supp.3d at 343; Nat’l Abortion Fed’n v. Ctr. For Med. 
Progress, No. C15-3522, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14485, at *58–*59 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 5, 2016). 
 42.  Nat’l Abortion Fed’n, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14485, at *5.
43.  Id. at *6.  
 44.  Id. at *15. 
 45.  Complaint. at ¶ 98, Nat’l Abortion Fed’n, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14485.  
 46.  Id. at ¶ 108. 
 47.  Nat’l Abortion Fed’n, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14485 at *1, *5. 





      12/07/2018   13:09:16
SCOTT_FINAL TO PRINTERS 11.18.18 (DO NOT DELETE) 11/18/2018 4:32 PM
Winter 2019]    WAIVING GOODBYE TO FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS 457 
2.  Publishing or disclosing to any third party the dates and 
locations of any future NAF meetings; and 
3.  Publishing or otherwise disclosing to any third party the names 
or addresses of any NAF members learned at any annual NAF 
Meetings.48
Defendants argued that the injunction infringed on their First 
Amendment rights because it prohibited them from releasing any video or 
recordings demonstrating alleged criminal wrongdoings by abortion 
providers and de-sensitization of the abortion industry as a whole.49  Thus, 
CMP claimed the injunction would be an unconstitutional prior restraint.50
CMP argued public policy was on their side because the criminality and de-
sensitization of abortion providers is of significant public interest.51  Judge 
Orrick, however, ruled that while the injunction did infringe on speech, the 
defendants had waived their First Amendment rights by signing multiple 
contracts, including confidentiality agreements that were mandatory for 
exhibitors to attend the 2014 and 2015 NAF annual meetings52 due to 
increasing hostility against abortion providers.53
Judge Orrick, applying the criminal right waiver standard,54 held that 
First Amendment speech rights can be knowingly, voluntarily, and 
intelligently waived by contract, and he thereby granted the injunction. 55  He 
found that CMP had knowingly and intelligently waived its First 
Amendment rights by signing the NAF confidentiality agreements.56
Analyzing whether CMP’s waiver should be set aside on public policy 
grounds under Ninth Circuit law,57 Judge Orrick balanced the public policy 
interest on both sides, ultimately ruling in NAF’s favor that public policy 
supported enforcing CMP’s First Amendment waiver.58  He based this on a 
number of considerations, including the existing constitutional right to 
abortion, NAF members’ right to associate in safety and privacy, and 
California’s acknowledgment through legislative findings that abortion 
providers are often subjected to increased danger because of their profession 
 48.  Nat’l Abortion Fed’n, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14485, at *89. 
49.  Id. at *64,*67. 
 50.  Id. at *6. 
 51.  Id. at *64. 
 52.  Id. at *57.  
 53.  Complaint at ¶ 6, Nat’l Abortion Fed’n, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14485. 
 54.  See infra Section VI. 
 55.  Nat’l Abortion Fed’n, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14485, at *58–59. 
 56.  Id.
 57.  See Leonard v. Clark, 12 F.3d 885, 886 (9th Cir. 1993). 
 58.  Nat’l Abortion Fed’n, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14485, at *80. 
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and their private information requires special protections, and the absence of 
any evidence supporting CMP’s claims that NAF or its members were 
engaged in any alleged “criminal wrongdoing.”59
Defendants subsequently appealed to the Ninth Circuit.  In a non-
precedential memorandum opinion, the Ninth Circuit upheld the preliminary 
injunction, stating that the district court did not err in finding First 
Amendment waiver based on the defendants’ knowing agreement to the 
confidentiality clause in NAF’s conference agreements, or in concluding that 
a balancing of the competing interests favored enforcement of those 
agreements.60  Defendants subsequently petitioned for certiorari to the 
Supreme Court,61 which Supreme Court denied on April 2nd, 2018.62
2.  Leonard v. Clark: First Amendment Waiver is Enforceable in a 
Union Collective Bargaining Agreement.
Judge Orrick decided National Abortion Federation v. Center For 
Medical Progress against the backdrop of Ninth Circuit law, as reflected in 
decisions like Leonard v. Clark, in which the Ninth Circuit affirmed the U.S. 
District Court of the District of Oregon’s finding of First Amendment waiver 
that resulted from a collective bargaining agreement.63  In Leonard, the 
Plaintiffs Portland Firefighters Association (hereinafter, the “Union”) signed 
a collective bargaining agreement with Portland, agreeing to Article V––
which established that any increase in payroll costs resulting from legislative 
changes endorsed or supported by the Union would be charged against the 
Union-City Salary Agreement when such legislation went into effect.64  The 
Union sued Portland and sought to have the district court declare Article V 
of their collective bargaining agreement invalid as a violation of the Unions’ 
First Amendment rights.65  Portland’s defense was that the Union waived its 
First Amendment rights by signing the collective bargaining agreement.66
The Ninth Circuit agreed with Portland, holding that “First Amendment 
rights may be waived upon clear and convincing evidence that waiver is 
 59.  Nat’l Abortion Fed’n, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14485, at *80. 
 60.  Nat’l Abortion Fed’n v. Ctr. For Med. Progress, 685 Fed. App’x 623, 626 (9th Cir. 2017). 
 61.  Brief for Petitioner at 18, Daleiden v. Nat’l Abortion Federation, 2017 WL 3393651 (U.S. 
2017) (No. 17-202). 
 62.  Newman v. Nat’l Abortion Fed’n, 2018 U.S. LEXIS 2168, *1; Daleiden v. Nat’l Abortion 
Fed’n, 2018 U.S. LEXIS 2115, *1.  
 63.  Leonard v. Clark, 12 F.3d 885, 892 (9th Cir. 1993). 
 64.  Id. at 886. 
 65.  Id.
 66.  Id. at 887.  
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knowing, voluntary, and intelligent,”67 and finding that standard satisfied 
because the Union “as advised by competent counsel during the 
negotiations,” “explicitly objected to Article V” during the negotiations, yet 
“voluntarily signed the labor agreement” notwithstanding its objections.68
The Ninth Circuit held that “[i]f the Union felt that First Amendment rights 
were burdened by Article V, it should not have bargained them away and 
signed the agreement.”69, 70  Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit has established 
that contracts can evidence knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver 
because parties have the ability to exchange rights in the bargaining 
process.71
B.  First Amendment Waiver is Enforceable in the Third Circuit 
The Third Circuit is in agreement with the Ninth Circuit’s position on 
First Amendment waiver.  In two cases, Barnard v. Lackawanna County and 
Democratic National Committee. v. Republican National Committee, the 
Third Circuit has upheld contracts waiving the parties’ First Amendment 
rights.
In a case factually similar to Leonard, in Barnard, the plaintiff was 
suspended from her position after participating in union picketing.72  The 
plaintiff was a participant in a collective bargaining agreement that required 
the parties not participate in sympathy protests.73  The Third Circuit held that 
a party may waive their First Amendment rights when there is clear and 
convincing evidence of knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver.74  The 
Third Circuit affirmed the district court’s determination that waiver is more 
likely to have occurred when the facts indicate that the parties have engaged 
in bargaining or negotiation, and the parties were represented by counsel in 
the negotiations.75
 67.  Leonard, 12 F.3d at 889 (citing D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174 (1972). In 
D.H. Overmyer Co, the Supreme Court discusses waiver of due process rights and applies the 
criminal waiver standard to a non-criminal right.  The Leonard Court’s opinion claims that D.H. 
Overmyer Co. refers to First Amendment waiver, but on review, that it refers to waiver of due 
process rights.  
68.  Id. at 890.  
 69.  Id.
 70.  The Ninth Circuit went on to address whether the Union’s knowing, voluntary, and 
intelligent waiver should be set aside and rendered non-enforceable on public policy grounds. 
Leonard, 12 F.3d at 890.  However, this prong of the analysis is not the focus of this Note and 
therefore will not be further addressed.  
 71.  Id. at 890.   
72.  Barnard v. Lackawanna Cty., 194 F.Supp.3d 337, 338 (2016).
 73.  Id. at 343. 
 74.  Id.
 75.  Id. at 344. 
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The Barnard court relied on the waiver standard established in 
Democratic National Committee v. Republican National Committee, a Third 
Circuit case from 2012.76  The Republican National Committee (“RNC”) 
sought modification of a consent decree with the Democratic National 
Committee (“DNC”) limiting its ability to engage or assist in voter fraud 
prevention without advanced court approval.77  RNC claimed that the 
consent decree violated the First Amendment because its advanced approval 
requirement was a prior restraint on their right to engage in political speech 
and the order forced speech by requiring a list of unlawful practices to be 
distributed with any ballot provided to a state party.78  The Democratic 
National Party court held that a party may waive constitutional rights when 
there is clear and compelling evidence of knowing, voluntary, and intelligent 
waiver.79  Several factors demonstrated that the RNC had waived its rights.  
First, the RNC had equal bargaining power with the DNC, and had not 
contended it did not know the significance of the consent decree.80  Second, 
the RNC had obtained consideration for entering the agreement through a 
release of DNC’s claims.81  Cumulatively, these factors established that there 
was clear and convincing evidence that RNC knowingly, voluntarily, and 
intelligently waived its First Amendment rights.82
The Third and Ninth Circuit courts agree that First Amendment rights 
may be waived by contract.  Further, both Circuits require a showing that 
waiver by contract was made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently, and 
that evidence of waiver must be clear and convincing.  Thus, First 
Amendment waiver by contract mirrors the requirements laid out in the 
doctrine for waiver of criminal rights, only deviating in regard to the 
applicable evidentiary standard.  Civil waiver requires a clear and convincing 
standard,83 while criminal courts apply a preponderance standard in criminal 
proceedings.84
 76.  Barnard, 194 F.Supp.3d at 343.  
 77.  Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Republican Nat’l Comm., 673 F.3d 192, 200 (3d Cir. 2012). 
 78.  Id. at 204. 
 79.  Id. at 205.  
 80.  Id. at 206–07. 
 81.  Id.
 82.  Id.
 83.  Leonard v. Clark, 12 F.3d 885 (9th Cir. 1993); Barnard v. Lackawanna Cty., 194 
F.Supp.3d 337, 343 (2016).
 84.  See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 469 (1938); Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 489 
(1972); Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 168 (1986). 
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III.  Court Enforcement of a Contract Is Sufficient State Action 
to Implicate the First Amendment 
First Amendment waiver requires state action. Absent state action, the 
First Amendment cannot be invoked because it is a limitation on the 
government, not individuals.85  This necessarily raises a threshold question 
to defenses asserting waiver of First Amendment rights.  If First Amendment 
rights may be waived by contract between private parties, how does judicial 
enforcement of those contracts involving solely non-government actors 
implicate “state action?”  As discussed below, the Supreme Court has not 
directly addressed this question.86  Traditionally, state action requires the 
state’s interference with a constitutional right.87  This reflects the Supreme 
Court’s desire to uphold a division between government and private action 
in relation to constitutional rights.88  The courts can only enforce First 
Amendment waiver between third party contracts if there is state action.  
This is because the First Amendment is a limitation on state action, not 
private action.89  As it is a prohibition on the government, in the absence of 
governmental interference of speech, the First Amendment will not normally 
be implicated by a non-governmental party’s interference with free speech. 
For example, in National Abortion Federation v. Center for Medical 
Progress, state action was necessary in order for the defendants’ First 
Amendment rights to be implicated.  In the above case, the defendants’ First 
Amendment Rights could not have been violated in the absence of state 
action.  The First Amendment was only implicated in this case because the 
court issued a preliminary injunction enjoining defendants’ ability to release 
digital media and names of conference attendees.90  Therefore, unless state 
action is has occurred, waiver of First Amendment rights is not at issue in 
cases involving third party contracts. 
The Supreme Court addressed state action in third party contracts in its 
1991 opinion Cohen v. Cowles.91  In Cohen, after Cohen sued for breach of 
contract, defendant Cowles Media argued that the First Amendment barred 
enforcement of the agreement because it would infringe on its free speech.92
The Minnesota Supreme Court concluded the Cohen’s breach of contract 
 85.  See U.S. CONST. amend. I; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
 86.  See Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663 (1991) (addressing enforcement of a 
promissory estoppel claim which operated in the absence of a valid contract.). 
 87.  Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 620 (1991). 
 88.  Id.
 89.  Cent. Hardware Co. v. N.L.R.B., 407 U.S. 539, 547 (1972). 
 90.  Nat’l Abortion Fed’n v. Ctr. For Med. Progress, No. C15-3522, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
14485, at *89 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 5, 2016). 
 91.  Cohen, 501 U.S. at 667. 
92.  Id. at 667.
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claim was an unenforceable “moral commitment,”93 but that he could 
proceed under a promissory estoppel theory (which the Minnesota Supreme 
Court raised on its own initiative).94  On review, the Supreme Court held that 
a promissory estoppel claim between private actors involved state action 
within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.95  The Court concluded 
that the application of state rules of law in state courts in a manner alleged 
to restrict First Amendment freedom is sufficient to support a finding of state 
action.96  Specifically, in Cohen, the Minnesota Supreme Court’s holding 
that Cohen could recover under a promissory estoppel theory was sufficient 
to establish state action.97  The fact that the state court could enforce the legal 
obligations established by the promissory estoppel theory was enough to 
constitute state action.98  The Court’s decision in Cohen shares this with 
Ninth and Third circuit courts’ opinions discussed above.  For example, in 
National Abortion Federation v. Center for Medical Progress, NAF asserted 
a claim for breach of contract under California law and Defendants argued 
that enforcement of the contract infringed on First Amendment rights.99
Following Cohen’s holding, when NAF sought enforcement of the contract 
under state law and Defendants alleged that enforcement violated their First 
Amendment rights, state action was established.  In other words, when a 
court enforces legal obligations established by a contract under state law, it 
is state action and the First Amendment can be implicated and waived. 
IV.  The Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine Does Not Apply 
to First Amendment Waiver by Contract When an Agreement Is 
Between Private Parties 
Some academics have argued that waiver of constitutional rights is 
governed by the unconstitutional conditions doctrine in all cases except 
criminal rights.100  The unconstitutional conditions doctrine holds that the 
government itself cannot condition benefits on an agreement to surrender 
 93.  Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 457 N.W.2d 199, 203 (Minn. 1990) (“The parties 
understand that the reporter’s promise of anonymity is given as a moral commitment, but a moral 
obligation alone will not support a contract.”). 
 94.  Id.   
 95.  Cohen, 501 U.S. at 668. 
 96.  Id.
 97.  Id.
 98.  Id.
 99.  Nat’l Abortion Fed’n v. Ctr. For Med. Progress, No. C15-3522, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
14485, at *44, *3 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 5, 2016). 
 100.  Jesse H. Choper, The Supreme Court and Unconstitutional Conditions: Federalism and 
Individual Rights, 4 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 460, 460 (1995); Jason Mazzone, The Waiver 
Paradox, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 801, 802 (2003). 
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(waive) a constitutional right.101  Thus, in cases in which the government has 
offered a benefit in exchange for waiver of First Amendment rights, the 
waiver will ordinarily not be enforced.102  However, the Supreme Court has 
expressly stated that the unconstitutional conditions doctrine does not apply 
in cases where the government is not involved.103  Accordingly, while state 
action exists, the unconstitutional conditions doctrine is not invoked in this 
context because the government is not a party to the original agreement and 
the requisite exchange of consideration necessary to invoke the doctrine.  
Because the unconstitutional conditions doctrine does not apply to waiver of 
criminal rights,104 the criminal rights waiver doctrine provides a pathway for 
evaluating waiver of First Amendment rights by contract.  In fact, this is just 
what the lower courts have done––rather than create a new standard for First 
Amendment waiver, the Third and Ninth Circuits have relied on the criminal 
rights waiver standard in reviewing First Amendment waiver by contract.105
V.  The Criminal Rights Waiver Standard Requiring Knowing, 
Voluntary, and Intelligent Waiver Is the Standard Applied to 
First Amendment Waiver 
As discussed above, waiver doctrine is firmly rooted in criminal 
procedure, having its origins in Johnson v. Zerbst, a Sixth Amendment case
in which the Supreme Court held that waiver was the relinquishment or 
abandonment of a known right or privilege.106  In 1966, in Miranda v. 
Arizona, the Supreme Court concluded that criminal waiver must be made 
knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently.107  The Supreme Court established 
that individuals may waive the Fourth Amendment right against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, the Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination, the Sixth Amendment rights to a jury trial, confrontation, the 
assistance of counsel, and disclosure of material impeachment evidence.108
Similarly, the Supreme Court has indicated First Amendment waiver is 
 101.  Epstein, supra note 12, at 7. 
 102.  Snepps v. United States suggests that the unconstitutional conditions doctrine is not an 
absolute prohibition against government agreements to surrender a constitutional right.  In Snepps,
the CIA was permitted to restrict Snepp’s speech because of his employment agreement due to the 
CIA’S concern that Snepp’s book was a risk to national security.  444 U.S. 507, 515–16 (1983). 
 103.  Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 197 (1991). 
 104.  Mazzone, supra, note 100, at 832. 
 105.  Leonard v. Clark, 12 F.3d 885, 886 (9th Cir. 1993); Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. 
Republican Nat’l Comm., 673 F.3d 192, 206–07 (3d Cir. 2012); Barnard v. Lackawanna Cty., 194 
F.Supp.3d 337, 343 (2016); Nat’l Abortion Fed’n v. Ctr. For Med. Progress, No. C15-3522, 2016 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14485, at *58–*59 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 5, 2016). 
 106.  Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938). 
 107.  Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 445 (1966). 
 108.  Mazzone, supra, note 100 at 831. 
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permissible in circumstances in which the government is not involved, and 
the unconstitutional conditions doctrine is not the appropriate standard to 
apply to First Amendment waiver by contract.109  In the absence of further 
direction from the Supreme Court, the Third and Ninth Circuits have 
subscribed to the criminal rights waiver standard in cases involving waiver 
of First Amendment rights by contract.110  Therefore, a full understanding of 
how the criminal rights waiver standard is applied can be derived from 
Supreme Court cases involving waiver of criminal rights and serve to 
illuminate how to analyze First Amendment waiver. 
A.  The First Amendment Is a Fundamental Right and Should 
Be Afforded the Same Level of Review as Criminal Trial 
Rights
The First Amendment deserves the same protections afforded by the 
presumption against waiver of constitutional rights because it is a 
fundamental right.  The criminal rights waiver standard requiring knowing, 
voluntary, and intelligent waiver applies to rights intended to guarantee a fair 
trial.111  Further, the Supreme Court has held that the ‘“courts indulge every 
reasonable presumption against waiver’ of fundamental constitutional rights 
and that we ‘do not presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental 
rights.’”112  It is without question that the First Amendment right to freedom 
of speech is a fundamental right.113  However, in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,
a Fourth Amendment search and seizure case, the Supreme Court claimed 
the criminal rights waiver standard was applied “almost without exception 
to those rights which the Constitution guarantees to a criminal defendant in 
order to preserve a fair trial.”114  Despite the holding in Schneckloth, the First 
Amendment is entitled to the same protections afforded to fair trial rights. 
While the First Amendment is heavily implicated in the criminal 
context,115 it is not a right intended to guarantee a fair trial and would not be 
subject to the criminal waiver standard under Schneckloth.  The First 
Amendment is intended to guarantee the preservation of an effective system 
 109.  Mazzone, supra, note 100 at sections II and V.  
 110.  Leonard, 12 F.3d at 889; Democratic Nat’l Comm., 673 F.3d at 205; Barnard, 194 
F.Supp.3d at 343; Nat’l Abortion Fed’n, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14485, at *60. 
 111.  Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973). 
 112.  Zerbst, 304 U.S. at 464 (citing Ohio Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 301 
U.S. 292, 307 (1937)). 
 113.  Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925). 
 114.  Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 237. 
 115.  Dan T. Cohen, Freedom of Speech and The Criminal Law, 97 B.U. L. REV. 1533 (2017). 
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of free expression.116  As the Supreme Court acknowledged in West Virginia 
Board of Education v. Barnette, “if there is any fixed star in our constitution 
it is that no official can prescribe what shall be orthodox . . . [in] matters of 
opinion or forces citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.”117
The Supreme Court has long acknowledged that the First Amendment is 
entitled to a similar heavy presumption toward the constitutional validity of 
prior restraints.118  A claim that the First Amendment is less deserving of the 
strict scrutiny afforded to waiver of criminal trial rights would be antithetical 
to the Supreme Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence.  Thus, because the 
First Amendment falls firmly within the realm of the fundamental 
constitutional rights the courts must strictly scrutinize cases in which waiver 
is implicated. 
B.  The Fourth Amendment Is an Exception to the Criminal 
Waiver Standard Because It Is Not a Fair Trial Right 
Of the three criminal rights in the Constitution derived from the original 
Bill of Rights (the right against search and seizure, the right against self-
incrimination, and the right to counsel), the Supreme Court has 
acknowledged that the Fourth Amendment against warrantless search and 
seizure is the only criminal right not offended by unknowledgeable or 
unintelligent waiver.119  The Fourth Amendment is an exception to the 
criminal right waiver standard because it is not intended to preserve a fair 
trial.120
In Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, police officers seized a stolen check that 
was located while the officers searched Bustamonte’s vehicle with 
consent.121  Bustamonte was charged with possessing a check with intent to 
defraud and filed a motion to suppress the check, arguing he had not waived 
his Fourth Amendment rights because his consent was not voluntary.122  The 
Supreme Court held that the knowing, voluntary, and intelligent 
requirements were not required for Fourth Amendment waiver because the 
test is “almost without exception . . . applied only to those rights which the 
constitution guarantees to a criminal defendant in order to preserve a fair 
trial.”123  The Supreme Court further determined that Fourth Amendment 
 116.  Thomas I. Emerson, Toward A General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J.
877, 878 (1963). 
 117.  W. Va. State Board of Educ. v. Barnette 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943). 
 118.  Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963). 
119.  Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 227. 
 120.  Id. at 238. 
 121.  Id.
 122.  Id. at 227.  
 123.  Id. at 237. 
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protections are not wholly indispensable to obtaining a fair trial and therefore 
do not require knowing or intelligent waiver.124  This anomaly should be 
considered a by-product of the Court’s effort to balance constitutional rights 
against the government’s ability to enforce the law.125  Therefore, the Fourth 
Amendment should be viewed as a unique circumstance rather than the rule.  
Accordingly the First Amendment should be subject to the same standards 
as the rights guaranteeing a fair trial because it is intended to preserve a 
system of free expression.126
VI.  Breaking Down Knowing, Voluntary, and Intelligent 
A.  “Knowing” Waiver Occurs When the Waiving Party Was  
Cognizant or Aware of the Rights Prior to Waiving 
Proper waiver of fundamental constitutional rights mandates that the 
waiver be made knowingly.127  Knowing waiver requires that the waiving 
party was cognizant or aware of their rights prior to waiving.128  In 1938, the 
Supreme Court in Johnson v. Zerbst held that knowing relinquishment of a 
right is dependent on the circumstances of the case.129
According to Black’s Dictionary, “knowing” means cognizant or 
aware.130  Knowing waiver is consistent with the dictionary definition insofar 
as it concerns the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.  For example, in Miranda v. 
Arizona, the Court held that waiver of the right against self-incrimination 
was knowing when the Defendant had been read his Miranda warnings, and 
given the opportunity to invoke the warnings.131  In Colorado v. Spring, the 
Defendant was informed of his Fifth Amendment rights twice by law 
enforcement, and he indicated he knew his rights and signed a form waiving 
Fifth Amendment protections.132  In Brewer v. Williams, the Respondent did 
not knowingly waive his right to Sixth Amendment counsel when he led 
police officers to the body of a child he was charged with murdering after 
the officer made the infamous “Christian Burial Speech.133  There, 
Respondent was in continual contact with his attorney, and he asserted on 
 124.  Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 238.  
 125.  Christopher Slobogin, The Liberal Assault on the Fourth Amendment, 4 OHIO ST. J. CRIM.
L. 603, 618 (2007). 
 126.  See infra section VI(A); Emerson, supra note 116, at 878. 
 127.  See infra section VI.  
 128.  See infra section VII. 
 129.  Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938). 
 130.  Knowing, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
 131.  Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966). 
 132.  Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 572 (1987). 
 133.  Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 404 (1977). 
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multiple occasions, that he would discuss the murder after consulting his 
attorney.134  Accordingly, Respondent did not knowingly waive his rights 
because he was aware of his rights and invoked them.135  In each case above, 
the waiving party was required to actually know which right they were 
waiving and intentionally abrogate that right.  Therefore, per the case law 
discussed, knowing waiver is made when facts indicate the person waiving 
is cognizant or aware of their rights and relinquished the right with that 
knowledge in mind. 
Similarly, both the Third and Ninth Circuits recognize knowing waiver 
in the First Amendment context.  In Leonard v. Clark, the Ninth Circuit held 
that waiver was knowing because the Union was represented by counsel and 
explicitly objected to Article V of their collective bargaining agreement.136
Furthermore, Portland suggested the language of the collective bargaining 
agreement.137  In Barnard v. Lackawanna, the Third Circuit held that a union 
can explicitly or implicitly waive an employee’s rights during the collective 
bargaining process.138  Barnard’s waiver was made knowingly, because it is 
made in exchange for a promise not to lock out union employees in exchange 
for waiver of the right to participate in strikes and protests.139  In both cases, 
the knowing requirement was met by evidence that the parties bargained for 
the terms of waiver and it was done intentionally in exchange for some 
consideration.
The First, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments all employ the same standard 
for knowing waiver.  In the above cases, the parties were either aware that 
they were exchanging one right for another, or that they agreed to accept the 
terms of the agreement.  Accordingly, the courts apply the dictionary 
definition in their analysis of knowing waiver.  This analysis is even simpler 
in the context of contracts, because often all parties bargained over and 
agreed to the contracts by signing the documents, and in so doing, knowingly 
waived their rights.140  Ultimately, the courts look for facts that indicate that 
the person waiving the right was cognizant or aware of their rights and 
relinquished the right because of their awareness. 
 134.  Brewer, 430 U.S. at 405–06.  
 135.  Id.
 136.  12 F.3d 885, 890 (1993). 
 137.  Id.
 138.  696 Fed. App’x. 59, 62 (2017). 
 139.  Id. at 62. 
 140.  Leonard, 12 F.3d at 889; Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Republican Nat’l Comm., 673 F.3d 
192, 205 (3d Cir. 2012); Barnard v. Lackawanna Cty., 194 F.Supp.3d 337, 343 (2016); Nat’l
Abortion Fed’n v. Ctr. For Med. Progress, No. C15-3522 2016, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14485, at *60 
(N.D. Cal. Feb. 5, 2016).  
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B.  “Voluntary” Waiver Is Determined by Reviewing the 
Evidence and Facts for Words or Actions Indicating Non-
Coerced Permission to a Waiver of Rights 
The Supreme Court requires voluntary waiver in criminal 
proceedings.141  The Fourth Amendment right against search and seizure may 
be waived voluntarily when there is a showing of consent.142  The Fifth 
Amendment right against self-incrimination requires that the waiver (in the 
context of confessions) be voluntary.143  In Miranda v. Arizona, the Supreme 
Court made it clear that the voluntariness of the waiver of the Fifth 
Amendment right against self-incrimination was a fundamental concern 
central to the creation of Miranda Warnings.144  There, the Court was 
concerned about the coercive effect of interrogations and sought to protect 
individuals from coercion by requiring the iteration of Miranda Warnings in 
order to establish the admissibility of confessions.145  In Zerbst, the Court 
held that Sixth Amendment waiver of the right to counsel required an 
intentional relinquishment of the right.146  In Henderson’s Distilled Spirits,
the parties were permitted to waive their right to jury trial by stipulation.147
Despite this comprehensive body of case law, pinpointing situations where 
waiver is voluntary remains tricky. 
Voluntary waiver occurs when a party’s words or actions indicate 
permission to a waiver of their rights.  Consent to waive a right cannot be 
given when it results from coercion, intimidation, or force.148  When the 
Supreme Court reviews cases dealing with voluntary waiver, it engages in a 
totality of the circumstances analysis looking for evidence of coercion or 
facts indicating a clear willingness of a party to waive their rights.149
Miranda v. Arizona is perhaps the most famous waiver case in the 
whole body of jurisprudence.  Miranda is an aggregate of four separate cases, 
all of which involved the custodial interrogation of defendants in police 
custody and oral admissions made during the course of interrogation.150  In 
each case in Miranda, the Defendants appealed their convictions, arguing 
that their confessions were inadmissible as a violation of their Fifth 
 141.  Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 445 (1966). 
 142.  Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 223 (1973).
 143.  Miranda, 384 U.S. at 457. 
 144.  Id.
 145.  Id. at 445. 
 146.  Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938). 
 147.  In re Henderson’s Distilled Spirits, 81 U.S. 44, 52 (1871). 
 148.  Id.
 149.  Miranda, 384 U.S. at 457; Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 233–34 (1973). 
 150.  Miranda, 384 U.S. at 440.  





      12/07/2018   13:09:16
SCOTT_FINAL TO PRINTERS 11.18.18 (DO NOT DELETE) 11/18/2018 4:32 PM
Winter 2019]    WAIVING GOODBYE TO FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS 469 
Amendment right against self-incrimination.151  The Supreme Court’s 
concern regarding coercive conduct is at the forefront of the Supreme 
Court’s opinion.  However, ironically, the best articulation of the Supreme 
Court’s coercion jurisprudence is found, not in the majority opinion, but the 
minority in Justice White’s dissent.  In his dissent, Justice White outlined the 
Court’s coercion analysis, stating that conduct is coercive when a defendant 
is deprived of free choice, or physical or psychological actions were of such 
a degree that a defendant’s will is overborne.152  Ultimately, coercion is an 
important component of analyzing the actions, not of the waiving party, but 
the party seeking the waiver of the right. 
Voluntary waiver not only requires a lack of coercion, but also a 
showing of consent.  Although the Fourth Amendment is an exception to the 
general waiver standard, it is still useful in demonstrating how the Supreme 
Court analyzes voluntariness.  In Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, the Supreme 
Court discussed two cases in which they reviewed voluntariness in the 
waiver context.  First, in Davis v. United States, the Court found voluntary 
waiver occurred when the Plaintiff unlocked a door at the request of federal 
agents.153  The act of unlocking the door served as sufficient action to 
demonstrate “acquiescence to the demand.”154  While the Court examined 
other salient facts in its analysis, it is evident that the most significant 
indicator of voluntariness was in the Plaintiff’s actions. 
By contrast, the Court in Bumper v. North Carolina found that the 
consent was not affirmative because Defendant claimed to have authority to 
search Plaintiff’s home with a warrant, but did not physically possess the 
warrant.155  Accordingly, the Plaintiff did not affirmatively consent to the 
search, because Defendant misrepresented his authority, effectively coercing 
Plaintiff into permitting entry onto the property.156  The Court’s discussions 
of Bumper and Davis provide examples as to what the Supreme Court is 
looking for when they analyze the issue of voluntariness.  Accordingly, 
voluntary waiver can be found under the following circumstances: (1) Where 
there is evidence demonstrating that the waiving parties’ words or actions 
clearly indicated a willingness to give up a right, and where (2) consent is 
given in the absence of any coercion by either party. 
Voluntary waiver by contract applies the same principles as voluntary 
waiver of criminal rights.  In fact, a contract makes the evaluation simpler, 
 151.  Miranda, 384 U.S. at 445.  
152.  Id. at 534 (White, B., dissenting).  
153. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 233 (citing Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 593–94 
(1946)).
 154.  Id.
 155.  Id. at 234 (citing Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 534, 548–49 (1968)). 
 156.  Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 234 (citing Bumper, 391 U.S. at 550).  





      12/07/2018   13:09:16
SCOTT_FINAL TO PRINTERS 11.18.18 (DO NOT DELETE) 11/18/2018 4:32 PM
470 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 46:2 
because the contract reduces the waiver to written word, therefore 
embodying the terms of the waiver and the consideration exchanged for the 
waiver.  In Leonard v. Clark, Barnard v. Lackawanna, and National
Abortion Federation (‘NAF’) v. Center. For Medical Progress, the courts 
reiterate that voluntariness is a requirement of waiver.  In Leonard, the 
waiver was voluntary because the parties had the opportunity to object to 
Article V in their agreement, and refused to sign the agreement based on 
their concerns.157  The fact that the parties signed the agreement despite their 
concerns made the waiver voluntary.158  Similarly, in Barnard, Plaintiff was 
a member of a Union involved in a collective bargaining agreement.159
Because Plaintiff chose to be a member of the Union, she voluntarily waived 
her rights through the collective bargaining agreement.160  In NAF, the fact 
that defendants chose to attend the 2014 and 2015 meetings, and signed the 
exhibition agreement, was sufficient to demonstrate they voluntarily waived 
their First Amendment rights in exchange for the right to attend the NAF 
meetings.161  Thus, the Ninth and Third circuit courts agree that in the First 
Amendment context, voluntariness can be demonstrated through evidence 
the parties consented to the terms of a contract.  In all three cases, the parties 
took part and acted to sign the agreements at issue, they were not coerced 
into waiving the rights.  Consequently, in exchanging their rights for some 
consideration, the parties voluntarily waived their First Amendment rights. 
The voluntary element is featured prominently in criminal cases 
involving the Fourth Amendment right against search and seizure162, Fifth 
Amendment right against self-incrimination,163 and the Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel.164  As demonstrated by the Third and Ninth Circuit courts, 
voluntariness is no different in the First Amendment context––the courts 
simply required a showing that the parties willingly exchanged their right, 
and that they did so without any coercion.165  Accordingly, in all cases 
involving the waiver of a constitutional right, waiver must be made 
voluntarily. 
 157.  Leonard v. Clark, 12 F.3d 885, 890 (1993).  
 158.  Id.
 159.  Barnard v. Lackawanna Cty.,194 F.Supp.3d 337, 343 (2016).
 160.  Id. at 343.
 161.  Nat’l Abortion Fed’n v. Ctr. For Med. Progress, No. C15-3522, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
14485, at *61 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 5, 2016). 
 162.  See generally Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973). 
 163.  See generally Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
164.  See generally Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938). 
 165.  See infra discussion VII. 
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C.  “Intelligent” Waiver Requires an Awareness of the  
Constitutional Right Waived and the Consequences of 
Waiving the Right 
“Intelligent” waiver is the awareness of one’s constitutional rights and
the consequences of waiving those rights.  According to the Supreme Court, 
intelligent waiver is determined using the same method as applied for 
making a finding of voluntary or knowledgeable waiver; in other words, the 
Court applies a totality of the circumstances analysis.166
In all likelihood, this analysis is a carry-over from Powell v. Alabama,
the first case in which the Court implicated the Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel.167  In Powell, the Defendants were young African American men 
who were “ignorant and illiterate.”168  The Court partially relied on the 
defendants’ ignorance in establishing the right to counsel, arguing that even 
an intelligent layman has little knowledge of the law.169  While waiver was 
not a defense presented in Powell, it can be implied that the Defendants could 
not intelligently waive the right to counsel because of their “ignorance and 
illiterateness” nor could they adequately defend themselves in the absence 
of counsel.  The Zerbst Court relied on Powell in establishing the waiver of 
the right to counsel.170  In reality, this element could potentially be removed 
from the test and incorporated into the knowledge element.  In fact, as 
discussed below, the Court generally performs the intelligence analysis as 
part and parcel of the knowledge analysis.
In Patterson v. Illinois, the Court reflects on cases in both the Fifth and 
Sixth Amendment context, holding that “intelligent” refers to choices “made 
with eyes open” or awareness of “the consequences of the decision to 
abandon a right.”171  However, this discussion is certainly conjunctive, 
requiring that the accused “kno[w] what he is doing” and “the nature of the 
right being abandoned.”172  In Patterson, the defendant was made aware of 
his right to counsel by virtue of being read his Miranda rights and the 
Miranda rights made him aware of the consequences if he chose to waive.173
Intelligent waiver does not require that the defendant know all possible 
consequences that could “flow” from his waiver.174  This holding suggests 
 166.  Zerbst, 304 U.S. at 464. 
 167.  See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932). 
 168.  Powell, 287 U.S. at 52.  
 169.  Id. at 45. 
 170.  Zerbst, 304 U.S. at 463, 463 n.10. 
 171.  Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 292 (1988) (citing Adams v. United States ex rel.
McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279 (1942); Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986)). 
 172.  Patterson, 487 U.S. at 292.   
 173.  Id. at 294. 
 174.  Id.
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that an individual cannot have an intelligent waiver in the absence of 
knowledge.  Intelligent waiver thus requires that the person waiving is aware 
of their rights and the consequences of waiving the right.
The Ninth Circuit performs the intelligence analysis for the First 
Amendment waiver by applying the same analysis as described in Patterson.
In Leonard v. Clark, the court held that waiver was intelligent because the 
parties were represented by competent counsel during negotiations.175  In 
Leonard, the court subscribed to the idea that because the Union was 
represented, it was aware of the rights being abandoned in the collective 
bargaining agreement.176  The court also believed the Union “intelligently” 
waived First Amendment rights because the parties commented on the terms’ 
potential First Amendment implications.177  This commentary was sufficient 
to make a showing that the parties knew of the consequences of waiving in 
accordance with the terms of the agreement.  In NAF, the court viewed 
Defendant’s knowing decision to sign the exhibitor agreement as sufficient 
evidence that he intelligently waived his right.178  Thus, it is apparent that the 
intelligence element occurs in conjunction with the knowledge analysis that 
occurs in both criminal and First Amendment waiver.
The “intelligent” element of waiver appears consistent across First, 
Fifth, and Sixth Amendment waiver.  Often, the “intelligent” is analyzed as 
part of the “knowing” requirement.  Thus, unsurprisingly, courts generally 
appear to analyze the “knowing” and “intelligent” requirements 
conjunctively.  Accordingly, when courts analyze waiver, they seek evidence 
that the person waiving their rights was aware of their rights (knowing) and 
the consequence of waiving their rights (intelligent).  Therefore, while the 
waiver is easily read as having three separate elements, the “knowing” and 
“intelligent” elements appear to be analyzed at the same time. 
VII.  The Evidentiary Standards as a Barrier to a Coherent 
Doctrine
It is evident from the above discussion that in both the criminal and First 
Amendment context, the courts rely on the same test to make a finding on 
waiver.  The sole difference between the two waiver doctrines lies in the 
differing evidentiary standards that the courts require in order to make such 
findings.  Perhaps the justification for the different evidentiary standards is 
 175.  Leonard v. Clark, 12 F.3d 885, 890 (1993). 
 176.  Id. at 890.
 177.  Id.
 178.  Nat’l Abortion Fed’n v. Ctr. For Med. Progress, No. C15-3522, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
14485, at *61 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 5, 2016). 
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simply a preference for protecting First Amendment free speech rights over 
risking errors favoring suppression of speech.179  The clear and convincing 
standard is theoretically a heightened evidentiary standard, and it bolsters the 
Supreme Court’s express holding that there is a strong presumption against 
waiver of fundamental constitutional rights.180
First Amendment and criminal waiver each apply two different burdens 
of proof.  However, this discrepancy is not a barrier to creating a cogent 
theory of waiver.  The circuit courts apply a clear and convincing standard 
to First Amendment waiver.181  By contrast, the Supreme Court applies a 
preponderance of the evidence standard in criminal waiver.182  This means 
the Court requires a showing that there is greater than a 50-percent likelihood 
that Defendant waived their right.183  Facially, the preponderance standard is 
the easier to meet than other burdens of proof because it is a lower threshold. 
In contrast, the lower courts have applied a clear and convincing 
standard in cases involving First Amendment waiver.184  The clear and 
convincing standard theoretically translates to a showing that there is a 
greater than 75-percent likelihood that Defendant waived their rights.185  A 
survey of ten Eastern District of New York judges performed by Judge Jack 
Weinstein indicated that judges felt that the clear and convincing evidence 
standard fell somewhere between 60 percent and 75 percent.186  Another 
survey of 170 federal judges by C.M.A McCauliff determined that judges 
considered clear and convincing to mean somewhere between 55 percent and 
95 percent, averaging around a threshold of 74.99 percent.187  This disparity 
indicates evidentiary standards are not absolutes, and as one honest judge 
expressed in Judge Weinstein’s survey on the different burdens of proof: 
I suspect all we do by talking about proof by clear and convincing 
evidence or proof that something does or does not persuade us by 
 179.  Frederick Schauer, Fear, Risk and the First Amendment: Unraveling the Chilling Effect,
58 B.U. L. REV. 685, 688 (1978). 
 180.  Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 469 (1938). 
 181.  Leonard, 12 F.3d at 885; Barnard v. Lackawanna Cty., 194 F.Supp.3d 337, 343 (2016.)
 182.  See Zerbst, 304 U.S. at 469; Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 489 (1972); Colorado v. 
Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 168 (1986). 
 183.  James Brook, Inevitable Errors: The Preponderance of the Evidence Standard in Civil 
Litigation, 18 TULSA L.J. 79, 85 (1982). 
 184.  Leonard, 12 F.3d at 889; Barnard, 194 F.Supp.3d at 343. 
 185.  Fredrick E. Vars, Toward A General Theory of Standards of Proof, 60 CATH. U. L. REV.
1, 18 (2010). 
 186.  United States v. Fatico, 458 F. Supp. 388, 410 (E.D.N.Y. 1978), aff’d, 603 F.2d 1053 (2d 
Cir. 1979). 
 187.  C. M. A. McCauliff, Burdens of Proof: Degrees of Belief, Quanta of Evidence, Or 
Constitutional Guarantees, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1293, 1328, 1332 (1982). 
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a margin of 60%, 70% or 80% is to give ourselves some language 
to explain a result that we have already reached by other means 
(e.g., where we do not wish to reach a result, we say that the 
evidence was not clear [unambiguous? undisputed?] and was not 
convincing [i.e., we are not convinced]).188
Other judges, in response to McCauliff’s survey stated that burdens of 
proof were semantics, for lay people with no understanding of the law, or 
simply a question of a factfinder’s satisfaction with the evidence.189
Therefore, while the preponderance standard is a lower threshold, judges 
appear to vary greatly in their application of the clear and convincing 
standard and their application may be much less stringent than the 
application of a percentage of belief.  Further, a deeper analysis of the 
preponderance versus the clear and convincing standard of proof has shown 
that in operation the standards rarely result in any variance in the outcome of 
a case.190  Accordingly, the different evidentiary standards do not have any 
significant consequences on the operation of the waiver rules. 
VIII.  First Amendment Waiver by Contract Contravenes the 
Purpose of the First Amendment but May be Justified When 
Interests Outbalance First Amendment Concerns. 
When the courts enforce a contract and suppress First Amendment 
rights, the courts are, by definition, imposing a prior restraint on speech and 
thus the same concerns governing prior restraint jurisprudence apply to cases 
enforcing contractual waiver.  As the Supreme Court has stated, waiver of 
(most) constitutional rights should be considered with every reasonable 
presumption against it and under First Amendment waiver, there is a heavy 
presumption against prior restraints.191  However, the Supreme Court’s 
holding does not ban prior restraints in every case.  Prior restraints are 
permissible in cases where there is judicial superintendence over the prior 
restraint and an immediate determination regarding the validity of the 
restraint.192  In holding as such, the Supreme Court has acknowledged that 
not every prior restraint on speech is a threat to the freedom of speech.  
Contracts appear to fall within the category of prior restraints where judicial 
superintendence is employed, therefore making their enforcement valid. 
 188.  Jack B. Weinstein, A Trial Judge’s Second Impression of the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 357, 362 (1992). 
 189.  McCauliff, supra note 187, at 1333. 
190.  Id. at 1334.  
 191.  Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963).
 192.  Id. at 71.  
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Permitting First Amendment waiver by contract is directly opposed to 
the theories on which First Amendment jurisprudence is founded.  The First 
Amendment’s primary purpose is to protect individuals from governmental 
interference with free speech, publication, assembly, and religion.193  As the 
Supreme Court has recited in its prior restraint decisions, “[i]t is better to 
leave a few . . . noxious branches to their luxuriant growth, than, by pruning 
them away, to injure the vigour [sic] of those yielding the proper fruits.”194
Enforcing contracts of silence is most certainly a “pruning of noxious 
branches” because it prohibits speech that is considered “noxious” as 
determined by the writer of the contract.  Certainly, it has great implications 
because waiving a First Amendment right will vary from contract to contract 
and therefore can range from a minor restriction on speech to a broad and 
burdensome constraint on speech and there is no way to know the level of 
speech constrained until enforcement is required.195  The courts are making 
value judgment when they balance enforcement of contracts and waiver of 
First Amendment rights.  In choosing to enforce these waivers, the courts 
signal a preference for enforcing contracts over protecting First Amendment 
rights.  That said, the justifications behind such contracts can be significant 
and the outcomes that could result from a lack of enforcement can be very 
serious and are therefore deserving of this preferential treatment. 
Contracts that employ suppression of speech as an enforcement 
mechanism are not without justification.  Such contracts can be used to 
protect the safety, privacy, and reputation of individuals, preserve national 
security, protect economic interests in the form of trade secrets and 
confidential interests, and prevent exposure to civil liability.196  Further, the 
courts appear to balance the interests underlying the contract against the 
rights being waived.  For example, in Snepp v. United States, the Supreme 
Court, in reviewing Snepp’s non-disclosure agreement, held that 
enforcement of the contract in the interest of national security was sufficient 
to justify the imposition on Snepp’s First Amendment rights.197  In doing so, 
the Supreme Court considered the impact of the speech against the interests 
protected by the contract.  As a second example, the court’s injunction in 
National Abortion Federation v. Center For Medical Progress is
undoubtedly a prior restraint because it prohibits CMP from releasing 
information obtained during the NAF meetings.  The outcome produces 
 193.  New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 716 (1971).
 194.  Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 718 (1931) (quoting REPORT ON THE VIRGINIA 
RESOLUTIONS, MADISON’S WORKS, vol. iv, 544.).
 195.  Perricone v. Perricone, 292 Conn. 187, 208 (2009).
 196.  See Nat’l Abortion Fed’n v. Ctr. For Med. Progress, No. C15-3522, 2016 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 14485, at *38 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 5, 2016); Garfield, supra note 14, at 269–72. 
 197.  Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 516 (1980).
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some conflicting feelings.  Legally, the defendants waived their First 
Amendment rights.  In refusing to void the contract in NAF, and therefore 
finding waiver, the court is protecting abortion and reproductive health 
providers from doxing (publicly posting private information as a form of 
revenge or punishment)198 and attacks that such providers are susceptible 
to.199  In enforcing the contract, the court prevents NAF providers and 
members from experiencing serious and potentially deadly harassment.  
Despite the suppression of speech in NAF, enforcement of the NAF contract 
results in an emotionally justifiable outcome because it protects an 
individual’s privacy and prevents their exposure to harm.  In both examples, 
the courts seek to balance the interests protected by the contract against the 
infringement on speech, showing that the courts will not always give 
preference to First Amendment rights, where a contract is controlling, and 
the interests outweigh the burden on speech. 
Ultimately, this tension between First Amendment rights and 
contractual interests will remain unless the Supreme Court chooses to 
confront First Amendment waiver by contract head on.  First Amendment 
waiver certainly disregards much of the justifications for the First 
Amendment’s existence.  However, the interests that can justify waiver by 
contract are also persuasive in force.  In the absence of contracts waiving 
First Amendment rights, individuals would be left at risk of significant 
exposure that has the potential to be more damaging than a limited 
imposition on First Amendment rights. 
Conclusion
Contracts are an everyday part of life.  From quickly accepting a 
clickwrap agreement to signing agreements for the privilege of attending a 
conference or class, contracts are everywhere.  Some contracts are minor and 
unburdensome, while others require the exchange of fundamental 
constitutional rights to varying degrees.  While the Supreme Court has been 
primarily silent and has not fleshed out the doctrine of First Amendment 
waiver, lower courts have taken the onus upon themselves and transposed 
the waiver standard of criminal waiver into First Amendment waiver 
doctrine.  First Amendment waiver must be knowing, voluntary, and 
intelligent, meaning: 
 198.  Dox, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/dox (last 
visited Apr. 12, 2018). 
 199.  Nat’l Abortion Fed’n, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14485, at *38 (citing NAF Statistics stating there 
have been over 60,000 incidents of harassment against abortion providers between 1997 and 2014).  
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1.  The individual waiving was aware of their rights (knowing) and 
the consequences of abandoning said right at the time of waiver 
(intelligent) and; 
2. The waiving individual’s words or actions clearly indicated a 
willingness to give up a right, and their consent was given in the 
absence of coercion (voluntary). 
Waiver of First Amendment rights is controversial because it is 
antithetical to First Amendment jurisprudence on freedom of speech.  In 
enforcing contractual obligations through orders suppressing speech, the 
courts are employing prior restraints on speech and giving deference to 
contracts and the interests they purport to protect.  In doing so, the courts 
must consider the interests at issue in the contract against the First 
Amendment rights being waived.  While waiver of First Amendment rights 
by contract is in tension with the theories underlying the First Amendment, 
in application the lower court’s deference to contracts serves to protect 
interests that could otherwise subject individuals and groups to great harm. 





      12/07/2018   13:09:16
SCOTT_FINAL TO PRINTERS 11.18.18 (DO NOT DELETE) 11/18/2018 4:32 PM
478 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 46:2 
*** 
